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"Ethnic Inequality and Coups d'État" published on by Oxford University Press.

AbstractTo what extent and under what conditions do democratic institutions reduce socioeconomic ethnic inequality? I argue that democratization reduces ethnic inequality by introducing electoral accountability, which facilitates a series of egalitarian policies. However, the effect of democratization is conditional on the distribution of resources under the previous, nondemocratic regime. Countries that were more ethnically unequal prior to democratization experience greater egalitarian effects following democratization. To examine the argument, I leverage multiple country‐ and group‐level measures of ethnic inequality. Using fixed effects regressions, instrumental variable analyses, and event studies, I demonstrate that democratization substantively reduces ethnic inequality, but mainly for countries with high predemocratic levels of inequality.

Vietnam's ethnic minorities, who tend to live mostly in remote rural areas, typically have lower living standards than the ethnic majority. How much is this because of differences in economic characteristics (such as education levels and land) rather than low returns to characteristics? Is there a self-reinforcing culture of poverty in the minority groups, reflecting patterns of past discrimination? The authors find that differences in levels of living are due in part to the fact that the minorities live in less productive areas characterized by difficult terrain, poor infrastructure, less access to off-farm work and the market economy, and inferior access to education. Geographic disparities tend to persist because of immobility and regional differences in living standards. But the authors also find large differences within geographical areas even after controlling for household characteristics. They find differences in returns to productive characteristics to be the most important explanation for ethnic inequality. But the minorities do not obtain lower returns to all characteristics. There is evidence of compensating behavior. For example, pure returns to location--even in remote, inhospitable areas--tend to be higher for minorities, though not high enough to overcome the large consumption difference with the majority. The majority ethnic groups' model of income generation is a poor guide on how to fight poverty among ethnic minority groups. Nor is it enough to target poor areas to redress ethnic inequality. Policies must be designed to reach minority households in poor areas and to explicitly recognize behavior patterns (including compensating behavior) that have served the minorities well in the short term but intensify ethnic inequalities in the longer term. It will be important to open up options for minority groups both by ensuring that they are not disadvantaged (in labor markets, for example), and by changing the conditions that have caused their isolation and social exclusion.

This article examines patterns in individual attachments towards the nation‐state in multiethnic countries. Specifically, we examine the effect of between‐ethnic‐group political and economic inequality on these attachments. Pairing attitudinal data from the sixth and most recent wave of the World Values Survey, administered between 2010 and 2012, with ethnicity measures from the Ethnic Power Relations dataset, we show that between‐ethnic‐group political inequality significantly weakens national pride and identity, but between‐ethnic‐group economic inequality does not have a similar effect. Our findings provide robust support for the view that ethnic‐group separatism in divided societies is motivated, not by the quest for economic power, but by considerations of lost status and dignity that can only be recovered through ownership in state institutions. Hence, the binding constraint on national integration in these settings is political, not economic, inequality.

AbstractRecent research has shown that inequality between ethnic groups is strongly driven by politics, where powerful groups and elites channel the state's resources toward their constituencies. Most of the existing literature assumes that these politically induced inequalities are static and rarely change over time. We challenge this claim and argue that economic globalization and domestic institutions interact in shaping inequality between groups. In weakly institutionalized states, gains from trade primarily accrue to political insiders and their co-ethnics. By contrast, politically excluded groups gain ground where a capable and meritocratic state apparatus governs trade liberalization. Using nighttime luminosity data from 1992 to 2012 and a global sample of ethnic groups, we show that the gap between politically marginalized groups and their included counterparts has narrowed over time while economic globalization progressed at a steady pace. Our quantitative analysis and four qualitative case narratives show, however, that increasing trade openness is associated with economic gains accruing to excluded groups in only institutionally strong states, as predicted by our theoretical argument. In contrast, the economic gap between ethnopolitical insiders and outsiders remains constant or even widens in weakly institutionalized countries.

AbstractWe argue that economic inequality between ethnic groups increases state repression. We contend that a high level of ethnic inequality fuels distributional conflicts between poor and rich ethnic groups. It also increases the salience of ethnic identity and promotes ethnic mobilization to challenge the status quo. This between-group tension creates collective grievances for ethnic groups, mounts challenges to incumbent governments and increases perceived threats to governments. The greater the perceived threats, the more likely that governments will employ coercive measures. We further argue that the impact of ethnic inequality on state repression is moderated by the level of democracy. Various institutional mechanisms in democracies increase the costs of repression, reducing leaders' incentives to employ coercive measures, even when facing high levels of ethnic inequality. Evidence from 152 countries between 1992 and 2011 supports our arguments.

Viet Nam's ethnic minorities tend to be concentrated in remote areas and have lower living standards than the ethnic majority. How much is this due to poor economic characteristics? Is there a self-reinforcing culture of poverty in the minority group? The authors find that differences in returns to productive characteristics are an important explanation for ethnic inequality. (DSE/DÜI)